Antitrust Immunity, Choice of Law, and Standing in "Walker Process" Patent Claims
In Unitherm Food Systems v. Swift-Eckrich, slip op. 03-1472, -1473, (Fed Cir. July 12, 2004), Unitherm alleged that ConAgra attempted to enforce the '027 Patent, which it obtained by defrauding the PTO. If true, ConAgra would lose its exemption from the antitrust laws. On the same basis, ConAgra's good faith attempts to behave in accordance with the patent laws would furnish a complete defense, and ConAgra would retain its antitrust exemption; ConAgra would have done little but attempt to enforce a patent right which it reasonably believed itself to possess. The Federal Circuit stated that
"As a matter of Federal Circuit antitrust law, the standards that we have developed for determining jurisdiction in a Declaratory Judgment Action of patent invalidity also define the minimum level of "enforcement" necessary to expose the patentee to a Walker Process claim for attempted monopolization. In other words, if the patentee has done nothing but obtain a patent in a manner that the plaintiff believes is fraudulent, the courts lack jurisdiction to entertain either a Declaratory Judgment Action or a Walker Process claim. . . .
"When the courts consider a patentee's behavior under Federal Circuit law and determine that it involved nothing more than an appropriate attempt to procure a patent and an appropriate attempt to enforce a legitimately obtained patent, the antitrust inquiry is over with respect to the behavior at issue. When, on the other hand, the courts consider a patentee's behavior under Federal Circuit law and determine that it involved either an inappropriate attempt to procure a patent or an inappropriate attempt to enforce a patent, the remainder of the antitrust inquiry must proceed under the law of the regional circuit. . . .
"Once we have determined, as we have here, that a patentee deserves no antitrust immunity, our inquiry shifts to apply the substantive antitrust laws of the regional circuit. To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize a part of trade or commerce under Â§ 2 of the Sherman Act, it would then be necessary to appraise the exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms of the relevant market for the product involved. Without a definition of that market there is no way to measure [the defendant's] ability to lessen or destroy competition. For Unitherm to possess antitrust standing under Tenth Circuit law, it must demonstrate that ConAgra's behavior caused it to suffer an "antitrust injury. . . ."
"In short, Unitherm failed to present any economic evidence capable of sustaining its asserted relevant antitrust market, and little to support any other aspect of its Section 2 claim. Unitherm has presented conclusory testimony from its expert that defines the market as coterminous with the patent based entirely on issues of technical substitutability, described no market analysis, inferred market power from the possession of a patent, tautologically equated unsuccessful attempts at collecting royalties with a dangerous probability of success, and inferred antitrust injury from economic loss. ConAgra is correct in asserting that Unitherm failed to provide any evidence capable of sustaining the jury's finding of antitrust liability. We therefore vacate the court's judgment of ConAgra's antitrust liability and the award of the consequent damages. . . ."
Courtesy of William F. Heinze
Thomas, Kayden, Horstemeyer & Risley, L.L.P.
100 Galleria Parkway, N.W., Suite 1750
Atlanta, GA 30339-5948 (USA)