The experimental use exception is not a doctrine separate or apart from the public use bar. EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Sys. Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Rather, something that would otherwise be a public use may not be invalidating if it qualifies as an experimental use. Electromotive Div. of Gen. Motors Corp. v. Transp. Sys. Div. of Gen. Elec. Co., 417 F.3d 1203, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (limiting "experimentation sufficient to negate a pre-critical date public use or commercial sale to cases where the testing was performed to perfect claimed features, or . . . to perfect features inherent to the claimed invention"). In Allen Engineering Corp. v. Bartell Industries, Inc., we catalogued a set of factors that in previous cases had been found instructive, and in some cases dispositive, for determining commercial versus experimental uses. 299 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002). These factors include:
(1) the necessity for public testing, (2) the amount of control over the experiment retained by the inventor, (3) the nature of the invention, (4) the length of the test period, (5) whether payment was made, (6) whether there was a secrecy obligation, (7) whether records of the experiment were kept, (8) who conducted the experiment, (9) the degree of commercial exploitation during testing, (10) whether the invention reasonably requires evaluation under actual conditions of use, (11) whether testing was systematically performed, (12) whether the inventor continually monitored the invention during testing, and (13) the nature of contacts made with potential customers.
Id. (quotation and alteration marks omitted). Though a prior commercial sale and not a prior public use was at issue in Allen Engineering, the factors explicated are equally relevant to an analysis of experimental use.
We have said that lack of control over the invention during the alleged experiment, while not always dispositive, may be so. Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 516 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In that case, we held that a public use had occurred, finding "dispositive" the fact that the patentee "did not have control over the alleged testing," which was performed by its customer. Id. Clock Spring argues that Fawley, a named inventor, exercised tight control over the demonstration, as shown through the detailed reports made of the demonstration. But, the detailed reports do not provide evidence that Fawley controlled the demonstration. An independent observer "analyzed and recorded" the 1989 demonstration. Three of the eleven Clock Spring installations were done by the pipeline’s personnel. None of these individuals was under Fawley’s control or surveillance. We need not, however, rely on lack of control as establishing public use because we conclude that the use cannot qualify as experimental for other reasons.
A use may be experimental only if it is designed to (1) test claimed features of the invention or (2) to determine whether an invention will work for its intended purpose—itself a requirement of patentability. See In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 536 F.3d 1361, 1373-75 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In other words, an invention may not be ready for patenting if claimed features or overall workability are being tested. But, there is no experimental use unless claimed features or overall workability are being tested for purposes of the filing of a patent application.8 See EZ Dock, 276 F.3d at 1352, 1354; Weatherchem Corp. v. J.L. Clark, Inc., 163 F.3d 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that the public use provision strives to provide "inventors with a definite standard for determining when a patent application must be filed" (quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, the experimental use negation of the § 102(b) bar only exists to allow an inventor to perfect his discovery through testing without losing his right to obtain a patent for his invention. See EZ Dock
Clock Spring does not urge that refining the claim limitations was the subject of the 1989 demonstration. Rather, Clock Spring argues that the demonstration was experimental because the 1989 demonstration was designed to determine durability of the method, i.e., its suitability for the intended purpose. See City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 136 (1877). The reports make no such explicit statement. The NCF report states that "[t]he purpose of this demonstration . . . was to demonstrate to Panhandle Eastern attendants and guests the steps of application and the ability of minimally-trained crews to make Clock Spring installations." J.A. 2447. The 1994 GRI report states that "[t]his demonstration was designed to familiarize pipeline personnel with the Clock Spring technology, and to begin training of maintenance personnel in the use of the coil pass installation method." J.A. 1441 (emphasis added). The demonstration was similarly described to the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") during prosecution, where the applicant stated that the purpose of the demonstration was to seek "input from people in the industry on the performance of the bands and the practicality of their installation techniques." J.A. 2452.
To be sure, the 1994 GRI report can be read as suggesting that the 1989 demonstration was for durability testing because it states that "recovery and analysis of installed composite after several years of exposure in pipeline settings was the only means of verifying the long-term performance of [the clock spring’s] composites in moist soils." J.A. 1441. Clock Spring’s problem, however, is that no report in the record states, or in any way suggests, that the 1989 demonstration was designed to test durability for the purposes of the patent application to the PTO. In fact, the reports make clear that the durability testing was for "acceptance by regulators and the pipeline industry," J.A. 1444, and that the 1989 installation was not dug up and examined until almost a year after the 1992 patent application. Thus, even if durability were being tested, it was not for purposes of the patent application, and cannot bring the experimental use exception into play. By filing the 1992 application, the inventors represented that the invention was then ready for patenting, and studies done thereafter cannot justify an earlier delay in filing the application under the rubric of experimental use.
Finally, Clock Spring asserts that because the Department of Transportation did not grant any installation waivers until 1993, the 1989 demonstration must have been experimental. This terse argument is unsupported by any citation to law. That the inventors were not legally allowed to perform the method on a pipeline in commercial operation, does not mean that a public use did not occur. The former fact has absolutely nothing to do with the latter question.
In summary, during the 1989 demonstration, all elements of the repair method in claim 1 of the ’307 Patent were performed. There was no evidence that the overall suitability of the ’307 Patent’s method nor any of the claim elements was being tested as would be required for experimental use. Accordingly, claim 1 of the ’307 Patent is invalid due to prior public use.